It is well-known in …nance and economics that …rms possess private information about their own operations and fundamental values. 1 We contribute to this literature by examining, in the context of the market for corporate control, how the transmission of non-public information about potential targets in ‡uences mergers and acquisitions. This is interesting because, despite extensive research on the determinants of acquisitions, we can still only imperfectly predict which …rms will choose to initiate acquisitions and, for those that do, how they choose among potential targets.
We capture a potential acquirer's exposure to target-speci…c non-public information by tracking the service histories of its directors over time. This is reasonable because the theoretical literature on boards of directors (Adams and Ferreira (2007) , Harris and Raviv (2008) , Song and Thakor (2006) ) and survey evidence summarized in Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) both indicate that most directors see themselves as playing an active role in setting corporate strategy (see also Demb and Neubauer (1992), pp. 43-44) . It is therefore not surprising that SEC merger documents o¤er countless cases con…rming the view that directors play an active role in acquisitions. In this paper we estimate the impact of historical interlocks on the decision to initiate acquisitions of linked …rms. In particular, our main analysis considers whether a speci…c 1 See, for example, Myers and Majluf (1984) , Travlos (1987) , and Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) .
2 For example, the S-4 form submitted in 2003 by Plug Power (a fuel cell system manufacturer operating mainly in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio) in regard to its acquisition of H Power (a fuel cell developer and manufacturer) reports that during the Fall of 2001 and Spring of 2002 the board established a special committee of three directors to consider potential acquisitions. This committee oversaw the process that eventually led to the November 11, 2003 announcement that Plug Power intended to acquire H Power.
historical interlock from an acquirer to a potential target increases the probability that the two …rms merge, and we …nd in a sample of publicly-listed U.S. …rms from 1996 to 2006 that a given …rm is about …ve times more likely to initiate an acquisition of a historically-interlocked target than some other unlinked …rm.
One advantage of historical interlocks over standard contemporaneous linkages (in which a director simultaneously sits on the two …rms'boards) is that historical interlocks are directional. Under our proposed mechanism this feature o¤ers a clear and testable prediction about the ‡ow of information from potential target to acquirer, and we show that targetto-acquirer ‡ows a¤ect merger pairings but that acquirer-to-target ‡ows do not. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the ability to overcome information frictions is important when acquirers search for suitable targets. We also …nd that the e¤ects of historical interlocks are stronger when the acquirer has better corporate governance, the director has a larger ownership stake at the acquirer, or the director played a more important role during past service at the potential target, all of which are more likely when the director has been exposed to deal-relevant information. The e¤ect of historical interlocks on acquisitions is also stronger when the linked …rms have less access to non-public information about one another through alternate channels such as social connections.
Since directors are not randomly assigned to …rms, persistent and unobserved network connectedness between …rms could pose a threat to the validity of our informational mechanism. Unobserved factors that might in ‡uence common director selection include governance structures, social connections, CEO entrenchment, board size, industry positioning, …rm size, and organizational strategy, among others. We control for such unobserved and time-invariant factors with …xed-e¤ects that include a unique dummy variable for each …rm and …rm-pair in our dataset. This analysis indicates even stronger e¤ects of historical interlocks on the propensity to merge, and suggests that …rm-pair speci…c network e¤ects are not driving the results. We proceed to estimate the extent to which time-varying unobserved factors might further in ‡uence director selection and …nd that they are also unlikely to explain our results.
There are many studies in which experience in executing particular corporate actions passes across …rms through director linkages. These actions include the use of poison pills (Davis (1991) ), option backdating (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2009) ), repeat acquisi-tions (Haunschild (1993) ), and taking …rms private (Stuart and Yim (2010) ).
3 But gaining know-how from another …rm in executing a corporate action does not necessarily imply that information was passed about that …rm. Other studies more related to ours use contemporaneous director linkages to examine how cross-…rm information may a¤ect the decision to initiate an acquisition or joint venture (e.g., Gulati and Westphal (1999) , Schonlau and Singh (2009) ), yet contemporaneous director linkages could be forged as part of a plan for acquisition and thus not necessarily re ‡ect the transfer of information about the target to the acquirer.
There is a large literature on social connectivity and how it a¤ects corporate decisions, but it is not obvious whether social networks are channels for information ‡ows or sources of agency problems (Freeman (1979) ). Our use of historical interlocks controls for observed contemporaneous inter-…rm connectedness, and we show across a variety of speci…cations that historical interlocks still exert an independent and positive in ‡uence on acquisitions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I develops our hypotheses and discusses a …rm's exposure to non-public information through the service histories of its directors. Section II describes the data, presents summary statistics, and lays out the estimation framework and identi…cation strategy. Section III presents the main results on pair-speci…c merger probabilities and supplemental evidence on the probability of entering a new industry through an acquisition. Section IV considers a number of potential channels through which information can pass from a potential target to an acquirer and assesses the available evidence for each. Section V conducts robustness tests related to alternative hypotheses, potential endogeneity and functional form assumptions. Section VI concludes.
I. Literature and Hypothesis Development
In this section we review the literature on cross-…rm information asymmetries to motivate our own measure of information exposure (i.e., the "historical interlock"). Then, taking its construction as given, we discuss the predictions for acquisition patterns that historical interlocks imply.
3 See also Davis and Greve (1997) , Haunschild and Beckman (1998) , and Sorenson and Stuart (2001) .
A. Measuring cross-…rm information asymmetries
A well-developed literature quanti…es the degree of information asymmetry between a given …rm and other market participants. Some authors propose that asymmetries are largest when analysts disagree about a …rm's prospects (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) , Thomas (2002) , and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) ), while others relate valuation di¢ culties to the idiosyncratic component of stock prices (Dierkens (1991) ), the quality of a …rm's accounting information (McNichols and Stubben (2009) ), or the existence and size of a de…ned bene…t pension plan (Cocco and Volpin (2009) ).
In contrast, we focus on a …rm's decision to acquire speci…c targets. To do this, we develop a measure of information frictions that varies across potential acquirers for each potential target and vice-versa. By supposing that directors at an acquirer are exposed to information about a potential target through past service on the target's board of directors, we de…ne a "historical interlock"for a potential acquirer as a binary indicator that varies at the …rm-pair level. We then build a comprehensive set of …rm-pairs, some of which actually merge and many others that do not, and assess how historical interlocks and other measures of target desirability a¤ect the propensity to merge.
Our historical interlocks by construction isolate instances where a current director at a given …rm served on the board of a prospective target two or more years ago. An alternative would be to measure inter-…rm information transfers with contemporaneous interlocks. Indeed, while it is natural to suppose that information about corporate practices can be transmitted through current linkages, they are more likely than historical interlocks to re ‡ect agency con ‡icts or strategic e¤ects unrelated to the transfer of private information.
Among other possibilities, these factors could include knowledge about a …rm's current negotiating position or a tendency to "stack"the target's board with directors from the acquirer shortly before announcing a merger. 4 The existence of such agency con ‡icts, if only in the minds of investors, may alter acquisition decisions in ways that are unrelated to the transfer of information. Since contemporaneous interlocks may simultaneously confer information and involve strategic e¤ects, their interpretation in this context is unclear.
Historical interlocks are distinct from contemporaneous ones and we propose that they isolate informational e¤ects more cleanly. This is because historical interlocks are directed in that if …rm i is historically-interlocked with …rm j in year t through a director k, it follows that director k has a …duciary responsibility to only one …rm at any given point in time.
It is also unlikely that director k would have obtained non-public information about …rm i while serving on the board of …rm j, since his service on …rm i's board had not yet begun.
This directedness allows us to test whether private information matters more for an acquirer seeking a target or for a target seeking an acquirer.
At the same time, we recognize that directors are not randomly assigned to …rms and that historical interlocks could in ‡uence mergers through other channels. We turn next to describe our main hypothesis and some of these alternatives.
B. Main hypothesis and alternatives
An ideal measure of an acquiring …rm's access to information about a potential target would isolate this from other factors a¤ecting mergers. While no ideal measure exists, our "historical interlocks" are more likely than the common alternatives to meet this criterion.
To guide the analysis, we now review the predictions associated with various interpretations of historical interlocks.
We propose that information transmission a¤ects acquisition patterns. This might occur if information allows acquirers to more accurately identify synergies associated with potential targets where an interlocked director once served, making these …rms more likely targets than unlinked …rms. 5 For example, given that acquisitions typically involve large capital outlays, risk-averse …rms may avoid negative outcomes by bidding for a known target even if the expected synergy is lower than that associated with a random unknown …rm.
Alternatively, as suggested by Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) , …rms may engage in an iterative and costly search for suitable targets in which access to non-public information would, by lowering search costs, lead …rms to prioritize known targets in the search queue. Similarly, information about potential targets may also improve an acquirer's ability to negotiate favorable deal terms (Custodio and Metzger (2010) ). In this case, …rms are again more likely to buy known targets, but with the additional implication that acquirers should pay lower deal premia on average. The ability to use information to improve negotiating is likely stronger for acquirers with interlocks that are either contemporaneous or very recent.
We say this because investment bank a¢ liations and the compositions of management and legal teams can change rapidly, and the acquirer will be able to negotiate more e¤ectively if the potential target has maintained the same business relationships that were in place during an interlocked director's prior service. Our historical interlocks by construction therefore re ‡ect negotiating power less strongly than contemporaneous interlocks, and we will test this implication empirically. Finally, information about targets gained by interlocked directors could be useful for integrating the two …rms' operations after the deal has closed. If the acquirer were to recruit the target's directors or place its own directors on the target's board at this time, the action would appear as a contemporaneous interlock. But there remains the possibility that the target's directors are moved to the acquirer two or more years before the announcement, and it is only in this unlikely case that such "board stacking" or "director take-on"would appear as a historical interlock.
7
All of these variants of the information hypothesis predict that historical interlocks will a¤ect target choice most when the experienced director once played an important role at the potential target, since in these cases he likely had better access to relevant information.
They also predict that past experience at the target will be more valuable when informational asymmetries are potentially large, as might be the case if the two …rms are not closely situated geographically. The ability of informed directors to in ‡uence mergers should also increase with the e¤ectiveness of the …rm's corporate governance since …rms with good governance are more likely to take advantage of available board-level information and are less likely to allow biased directors to in ‡uence merger decisions. Finally, given their informational advantage, acquirers should get better deals on historically-interlocked targets as measured by the market's reaction to a merger announcement.
8 7 This could also involve signi…cant con ‡icts of interest since the recruited director could pass information about the target's operations and outside options, allowing the acquirer to obtain more favorable terms (see, for example, p. 14 of Corporate Director's Guidebook, 5th ed). 8 An important caveat to this last prediction is that acquirers less skilled in identifying suitable targets might disproportionately rely on director experience relative to …rms with superior target identi…cation skills who might, for example, have an e¤ective standing acquisitions team. In such cases, we would observe a negative correlation across …rms between returns and historical interlocks even if director experience improved target selection for those …rms that relied upon it. More generally, endogeneity of the event being studied A broad set of alternative interpretations of historical interlocks implies that directors with past employment at potential targets are in ‡uenced by agency con ‡icts or psychological biases that a¤ect their decision-making (Asch (1951) , Freeman (1979) , Mizruchi (1996 ), Uzzi (1996 , Gulati and Westphal (1999) ). For example, psychological biases could lead directors in ‡uenced by familiarity (i.e., social connections) to pressure their boards to bid on …rms where they once served, resulting in deals that are on average less favorable for the acquirer.
Similarly, salience bias might lead directors to approve or suggest acquisitions of targets about which they are familiar with less regard for the e¤ectiveness of the deal. We will refer to these variants collectively as "psychological biases,"although it should be remembered that they could re ‡ect agency concerns as well. Unlike the information hypotheses, psychological bias suggests that the impact of informed directors depends on the in ‡uence they can exert on their boards, which is likely greatest for an executive or inside director. Similarly, because board ine¢ ciencies are more likely to a¤ect decision-making adversely in poorly-run …rms, psychological bias could be more severe for acquirers with ine¤ective corporate governance.
In these cases, the e¤ects of psychological bias could be reduced if the historically-interlocked director has a signi…cant ownership stake in his current …rm.
Another broad possibility could arise if similar …rms hire the same directors, since optimal board structure depends on …rm characteristics (Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) , Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) ). Because similar …rms are more likely to merge, an observed correlation between director connections and acquisitions could be driven by common characteristics. For example, directors with experience in a particular industry are likely to be hired by …rms in that industry.
9 This "director-…rm matching" or "spurious correlation" hypothesis predicts that the e¤ect of historical interlocks on mergers will be weakest for …rm-pairs that are similar. In these cases, inter-…rm director connections would also be random after conditioning on …rm-pair similarities, and thus make either …rm as likely as the other to become the acquirer. Finally, the spurious correlation hypothesis predicts renders complicated the interpretation of returns in this context (see, for example, Eckbo, Macksimovic and Williams (1990) , Li and Prabhala (2007) ). 9 Even outside the context of directors, an observed relationship between …rm actions and mergers could re ‡ect such unobserved …rm-pair similarity. For example, Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) study the wealth e¤ects of mergers among …rms that have prior business alliances. Gompers and Xuan (2009) measure the extent to which problems of asymmetric information are smaller among common pools of venture capital investors relative to independent venture capitalists, and …nd that having common venture capital investors increases the probability of a merger. no e¤ect of director experience on market reactions to a merger announcement or on deal premia. Our main measure of inter-…rm director connections is the historical interlock, which takes a value of unity for a potential acquirer in year t if at least one of its current directors served on the potential target's board in the past, but not in the past two years. In other words, for each …rm in our sample there are potential matches with a universe of possible targets, each of which is characterized by the presence or absence of a historical interlock.
II. Data and Experience Measures
Historical interlocks are thus meant to isolate situations where information about a target is all that is likely to remain with the potential acquirer and where the reverse (i.e., information transfer from acquirer to target) is much less likely. As discussed in Section I, the historical interlock stands in contrast with standard (i.e., contemporaneous) interlocks, which are de…ned for an acquirer i in year t as the presence of a current board member sitting, at period t, on a potential target's board. This necessarily implies that one of the potential target's current directors also sits on the acquirer's board so that, unlike historical interlocks, every contemporaneous linkage re ‡ects two interlocks, The deal value exceeds $1 million;
11 The annual data reported by Riskmetrics obscures the fact that annual meetings and thus director appointments are held throughout the year, complicating the decision of how to classify directors given that in some instances no cross-…rm overlap occurs within years while in others there are varying degrees of overlap. We take a conservative approach and count …rms as contemporaneously interlocked only in those cases where the director served on both boards in the prior year, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
The acquirer buys 20 percent or more of the target's shares;
The acquirer owns a majority of the target's shares after the deal.
Since our focus is on the acquirer's intent to buy the target, we do not condition on the outcomes of announced mergers, though nearly 99 percent of in-sample mergers are completed and our main results are una¤ected by this restriction. For the pair-speci…c analysis we require that at least two years of …nancial data for both potential acquirer and target is available from Standard and Poor's Compustat database and that the history of both boards' memberships is available for the duration of each …rm's existence in the sample period. To understand whether the multiple board seatings resulted primarily from simultaneous appointments or from director movements from …rm to …rm, Panel B shows the distribution of simultaneous director seatings at the director-year level. The majority (81.1 percent) of director seatings involve directors who serve on the board of a single …rm, 12.8 percent involve a contemporaneous interlock between two …rms, and 5.9 percent involve contemporaneous interlocks among three to …ve …rms. This indicates that most cross-…rm director connections occur when directors move across …rms over time, and thus are historical in nature rather than contemporaneous.
C. Descriptive Statistics
[ Table 1 here] Panel C of Table 1 indicates the roles played at the potential acquirer and target for both historically and contemporaneously-interlocked directors. For example, over a third of historically-interlocked directors were executives at the potential acquirer. A fourth were inside directors at the acquirer, while a third were inside directors during their earlier service at the potential target. Contemporaneously-interlocked directors, on the other hand, were more likely to be executives and less likely to be professional directors (i.e., "career directors") than were historically-interlocked directors.
Panel A of Table 2 lists the breakdown of in-sample acquisitions from 1996-2006.
These include 4,846 acquisitions totaling more than $1 trillion in market value. The inverted U-shaped time pattern of deals re ‡ects the merger wave of the late 1990s. Panel B, which presents the distribution of deals broken down by target industry, shows that 78.7 percent of all acquisitions involve targets in the manufacturing, services and …nancial sectors. The uneven distribution of deals across time and industries suggests that our empirical estimates should condition on the year and industry in which acquisitions occur. Panel C shows that 9.1 percent of in-sample merging …rm pairs were historically interlocked and that 6.3 percent of merging …rm-pairs were contemporaneously interlocked.
[ Table 2 here] Table 3 compares acquirer and target characteristics of in-sample …rms with the average for all S&P 1500 …rms. Consistent with previous studies, acquirers are larger, have higher free cash ‡ow, are less leveraged, and have lower sales-to-asset ratios but higher market-to-book ratios, while targets are more similar to the average S&P 1500 …rm.
[ Table 3 here]
III. Baseline Results
In this section we present our baseline …ndings, describing the estimation approach as we proceed.
A. Are …rms more likely to enter industries in which their directors have experience?
Before moving to our main analysis we check to see whether there is evidence in support of a di¤use role for directors'industry experience. The business press has long suggested that …rms pay particular attention to industry and M&A experience when recruiting new directors since these may be useful for evaluating large corporate initiatives such as diversifying acquisitions (see, for example, pp. 32-43 in Ward (2000) , pp. 25-50 in Shultz (2007) , and pp. 136-142 in Bowen (2008) ). A …nding in support of the more general hypothesis that industry experience in ‡uences the choice of industry that an acquirer enters through acquisition would suggest that director experience is a source of useful information for acquiring …rms, especially since experience in this context does not necessarily entail strategic con ‡icts.
12 To do this we estimate the following partial e¤ect:
where ACQ ik takes a value of unity if …rm i announces an acquisition of a target in industry k, which di¤ers from …rm i's own industry, and zero otherwise, and H ik is an indicator set to unity if acquirer i has a current director with board experience at any …rm in industry k.
Following Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008), we render equation (1) estimable by comparing …rms that initiated acquisitions of targets in industry k with those choosing not to acquire a target in industry k. The universe for each …rm is thus the set of all potential target industries. We limit attention to 2-digit SIC industries to construct a counterfactual set that is computationally feasible and retain only the …rst announcement made by each acquirer for a target in a given 2-digit industry. This yields 4,846 actual acquirer-industry mergers among 177,130 potential acquirer-industry pairs over the sample period.
We estimate the average partial e¤ect using the logit equation:
where I ikt is an indicator taking a value of unity if acquirer i has a director currently on the board of a …rm in industry k and X it is a vector of acquirer-speci…c control variables that may a¤ect the propensity to initiate acquisitions. The t; , w k , and w l are …xed e¤ects for years, the two-digit SIC code of the potential acquirer, and the two-digit code of the target industry, respectively, and
13 The coe¢ cient of interest, …rm enters industry k by buying a target there relative to other new industries.
[ Table 4 here] Table 4 reports the results. Column (1) shows that …rms are more likely to enter an industry where a current director has past board experience. The regression reported in column (2), which includes contemporaneous industry experience, indicates that this is also positively associated with the entry decision. To control for the role of other …rm characteristics, we add the leverage ratio and the log of the …rm's total assets to the regression in column (3). In column (4) we add the …rm's market-to-book ratio as well as the log of its sales and cash. 14 Including these controls lowers the estimated coe¢ cients on both historical and contemporaneous interlocks but they remain highly statistically signi…cant. The marginal e¤ects indicate that an acquirer with industry-speci…c historical director experience is 2.6 times more likely to buy a target in industry k relative to other new industries. Similarly, an acquirer with a contemporaneously-interlocked director is 2.7 times more likely to buy a …rm in industry k relative to others.
15
14 Total assets is Compustat item 6, sales is item 12, and cash is item 1. The leverage ratio is the sum of short and long-term debt (Compustat items 34 and 9) divided by item 6. We measure the numerator of the market-to-book ratio as the value of a …rm's common equity at current share prices (the product of items 24 and 25), to which we add the book values of preferred stock (item 130) and short-and long-term debt (items 34 and 9). We use book values of preferred stock and debt in the numerator because prices of preferred stock are not available on Compustat and we do not have information on issue dates for debt from which we might better estimate market value. We note that book values of these components are reasonable approximations of market values in stable interest-rate environments such as the U.S. during our sample period. We compute the denominator in the same way except that we use the book value of common equity (item 60) rather than its market value. We eliminate …rms with negative values for net common equity since they imply negative market-to-book ratios, as well as observations with market-to-book ratios in excess of 500 since many are likely to be serious data errors.
The sales-to-asset ratio (Compustat item 12 divided by item 6) is our proxy for TFP because individual …rm output is not available on Compustat to form the numerator implied by the basic AK model. Leverage is given by the ratio of short-and long-term debt to total assets (the sum of Compustat items 34 and 9 divided by item 6). 15 Marginal e¤ects of covariates on the dependent variable are obtained in the usual manner given coe¢ cient estimates for a dx i change in covariate i:
where odds(X) is the odds ratio constructed using the estimated coe¢ cients and is evaluated at the mean value of covariates:
B. Are …rms more likely to acquire speci…c historically-interlocked targets?
Having found that director industry experience has predictive power for an acquirer's choice of industry, we proceed to our main analysis which asks whether …rm-speci…c historical interlocks in ‡uence merger patterns between individual …rms. The baseline speci…cation is
where ACQ ijt now takes a value of unity if …rm i announces an acquisition of …rm j in year t and zero otherwise, and H ijt is an indicator set to unity if …rm i had a historical interlock with potential target j in year t and zero otherwise. X ijt represents a vector of …rm-pair speci…c control variables that may a¤ect the propensity to merge. In this case our intent is to measure the probability that …rm i acquires …rm j in year t. We include year ( t ) and industry (w k ) …xed e¤ects because merger waves tend to cluster along these dimensions (Harford (2005) ), and we account for arbitrary correlations in acquisition probabilities between individual …rm pairs by clustering standard errors at the ordered-pair level. In this case, the counterfactual universe for each …rm is the set of all potential targets in the sample. We make the analysis computationally feasible by restricting attention to all …rm pairs within major SIC divisions, generating a panel of 1,471,098 matched …rm pairs, 612 of which represent actual merger announcements.
16 Table 5 presents the results. Column (1) shows that the coe¢ cient for a historical interlock is positive and statistically signi…cant, consistent with the hypothesis that acquirers are more likely to buy …rms about which they have access to non-public information through directors'service histories. Column (2) adds contemporaneous interlocks, which also enter positively and are statistically signi…cant. We add several controls in column (3). These include measures of relative size (i.e., the ratio of acquirer-to-target total assets), relative sales productivity (sales-to-assets ratios), and relative market valuation (market-to-book ratios), all of which could re ‡ect increased investment opportunities or overvaluation and lead to a greater propensity for merger Rousseau (2002, 2008) , Harford (2005 ), Dong et al. (2006 ). We add two measures of network connectedness among …rm pairs in column 16 These estimates understate the e¤ects of historical interlocks because binary choice models such as the logit are downward-biased in rare-events contexts such as the present application (see, for example, King and Zeng, (2001) ). We address this further in Section VI by implementing procedures that relax the restriction on the set of actual merging pairs and restrict the size of the counterfactual set.
(4), namely dummy variables set to unity when the acquirer and potential target are in the same 4-digit SIC industry or are headquartered in the same county (Hoberg and Phillips (2010) ). Our main speci…cation in column (5) includes …xed e¤ects for major SIC industries along with the other controls. 17 The key …nding is that including these controls does not a¤ect the sign or statistical signi…cance of the estimated coe¢ cient on historical interlocks, though its size is slightly attenuated in columns (4) and (5), which suggests that historical interlocks are positively correlated with our measures of network connectedness. Turning to the other controls, a potential acquirer is more likely to buy a given potential target when the former is relatively larger and more highly valued than the latter. Interestingly, the relative sales-to-assets ratio does not seem to a¤ect matching.
[ Table 5 here]
As before, we assess the economic magnitudes of the estimated e¤ects using the odd's ratio evaluated at the covariate means. First and foremost, acquirers are 4.2 times more likely to initiate purchases of potential targets with which they are historically interlocked.
The probability of merging rises by 0.6 percent in response to a one standard deviation increase in relative …rm size and by 2.9 percent for a one standard deviation increase in relative market-to-book ratios. The same-county e¤ect is strong as well, with two …rms from the same county being 23 percent more likely to merge relative to an average …rm pair, while within-industry pairs are twice as likely to merge relative to across-industry pairs.
IV. Potential Channels
We now examine whether historical interlocks are consistent with the information hypothesis or whether the data are better described by one of the alternative interpretations.
The exercises conducted in this section also strengthen the argument made later in Section V that director selection is not driving the results.
A. Does the direction of information ‡ow matter?
Our prior is that information available to acquirers through a current board member's earlier service can be useful in selecting targets. An obvious alternative is that the relevant ‡ow of information runs in the opposite direction. For example, if a target believes that acquirers are generally overvalued and a proposed merger involves an exchange of shares, information gained by one of the target's current directors during past service at the acquirer could reduce uncertainty about the value of the shares being o¤ered relative to an unknown acquirer, making the target more likely to accept this particular o¤er. Alternatively, the target of a hostile takeover may be more likely to recruit as white knights those acquirers with which they have a historical interlock.
We test for the direction of information ‡ow by constructing "reverse historical interlocks," which are simply historical interlocks from targets to potential acquirers. Formally, we de…ne a reverse historical interlock for an acquirer when, in year t; one of the potential target's current directors once served on the acquirer's board but has not in the past two years. In constructing the counterfactual set, we match both actual and potential acquirers with actual and potential targets so that there is no distinction a priori between direct and reverse historical interlocks in terms of acquirer or target characteristics. Including reverse historical interlocks in our regressions also tests indirectly for whether our historical interlocks re ‡ect network connectivity or spurious director-…rm matching, since both of these alternative interpretations predict a positive and equivalent e¤ect of either type of interlock. Table 6 presents the results. The …rst row shows that historical interlocks remain associated with a higher probability that, for …rm pair ij in year t; …rm i will attempt to acquire j. The second row, on the other hand, shows that reverse historical interlocks are not statistically signi…cant whether or not historical interlocks are included in the regression.
Comparing Table 6 with Table 5 , there is also no evidence that the inclusion of reverse historical interlocks attenuates the e¤ect of historical interlocks. These results suggest that the direction of inter-…rm connections does matter, and is consistent with our hypothesis that access to non-public information is more important for acquiring …rms than for targets. This is perhaps unsurprising given that targets, at least in the case of cash deals, need only care about the price received rather than acquirers who must also consider synergies associated with a particular acquisition.
[ Table 6 here] B. Does a director's role in ‡uence the e¤ect of historical interlocks?
We now consider a number of director characteristics and how they a¤ect the operation of historical interlocks. We do this because understanding how various forms of director heterogeneity in ‡uence target choice can help to distinguish whether historical interlocks re ‡ect the transfer of information or other factors. For example, while the information view of historical interlocks predicts that non-public information about potential targets will a¤ect merger decisions, the psychological bias and negotiation interpretations are more closely related to the extent of an interlocked director's in ‡uence over the acquirer's board.
To explore these e¤ects, we …rst interact historical interlocks with indicators set to unity if a historically-interlocked director is an executive or inside director at the acquirer. 18 This of course assumes that executives and insiders can in ‡uence acquisitions more than other board members.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 report estimates from adding these interactions to the baseline speci…cation (i.e., the logit model in column (4) of Table 5 ). A positive coe¢ cient for either interaction would suggest that director in ‡uence, and thus psychological bias, can explain at least part of the e¤ect of historical interlocks on target choice. The coe¢ cient estimates are both negative and not statistically signi…cant, however, and their inclusion does not a¤ect the sign, statistical signi…cance or overall magnitude of the direct coe¢ cients on historical interlocks.
[ Table 7 here]
Second, if the information hypothesis is correct, evidence for it should be strong when a historically-interlocked director at the acquirer has a signi…cant ownership stake there. This is because stakeholding directors are less likely to let factors such as inattention, psychological bias, or maintaining social connections in ‡uence their decisions. We test this by interacting historical interlocks with an indicator set to unity if the director has a stake of less than one percent in the acquirer and zero otherwise. Column (3) of Table 7 shows that this interaction is indeed negative and statistically signi…cant and that the direct e¤ect of historical interlocks becomes larger.
Third, the information hypothesis predicts that information about potential targets will a¤ect merger decisions more when the historically-interlocked director played an impor-tant role on the target's board during service there. This follows because access to relevant non-public information about the target is likely to have been greater. In this case, we interact historical interlocks with indicators set to unity when the historically-interlocked director was once an executive, inside director or former employee of the target. Columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 7 add these interactions to the baseline speci…cation, and in all three cases the e¤ect of historical interlocks continues to be positive and statistically signi…cant. At the same time, and consistent with the information interpretation, the interaction terms are also positive and statistically signi…cant.
C. Historical interlocks and corporate governance
Psychological bias and network connections predict that motives other than maximizing synergies drive the e¤ects of historical interlocks on merger decisions. As additional tests of these possibilities, we use data from the IRRC Corporate Takeover Defenses Database, which includes an index of overall governance quality originally constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) as well as information on individual governance provisions. If historical interlocks a¤ect merger decisions more strongly for …rms with weak governance provisions regarding agency con ‡icts between directors and shareholders, this would o¤er support for one or both of the alternative theories. We examine three characteristics of the acquiring …rm's board.
First, under "duties" provisions, directors are not precluded from acting in the interests of non-shareholders when evaluating an acquisition. Second, when the …rm has indemni…cation contracts in place, directors are protected from certain legal actions such as lawsuits …led by shareholders for perceived breaches of …duciary responsibility. Finally, "care" provisions limit director liability arising from breaches of their "duty of care."
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The requirement that governance data be available for each potential acquirer reduces the number of observations in our sample by 70 percent, given that the Gompers at al.
(2003) index covers the S&P 500 (i.e., the largest …rms in our sample) or …rms that are included in the annual lists of the largest corporations published by Forbes, Fortune, and Businessweek. To allow comparisons with our earlier results, we therefore re-estimate the baseline regression reported in column (4) of Table 5 using only those observations for which governance data is available for the acquirer. These results appear in column (1) of Table   19 A director's "duty of care" involves a responsibility to be informed and active when making corporate decisions and to do so using prudence and sound judgment (see, for example, pp. 18-21 of Corporate Director's Guidebook 5th ed.). 8, and indicate that the e¤ect of historical interlocks on the propensity to merge is still positive and highly signi…cant statistically but smaller in magnitude than that obtained with the unrestricted sample. Columns (2), (3) and (4) add interactions of historical interlocks with indicators for the "duties," "contract," and "care" provisions. These interactions are not statistically signi…cant and the direct e¤ect of historical interlocks is largely una¤ected by their inclusion, which is opposite to the predictions of the network connections and psychological bias theories.
[ Table 8 here]
Next, we interact historical interlocks with the index of corporate governance, which is de…ned so that larger values re ‡ect worse overall corporate governance. In doing so, we ask whether the e¤ect of historical interlocks on target selection is stronger when the acquirer has poor governance. A positive coe¢ cient on the interaction term would answer in the a¢ rmative and o¤er support for the network connections or psychological bias theories. The regression reported in column (5), however, indicates a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient on the interaction term, which is consistent with a stronger e¤ect of historical interlocks for acquirers with good governance.
In Columns (6) and (7) we interact historical interlocks with two additional measures of governance that address acquisitions in particular. Control-share acquisition laws deny voting rights to newly-quali…ed large shareholders unless approved by a majority of disinterested shareholders, while supermajority provisions allow increases in the voting threshold needed to approve deals beyond state-level mandates so that mergers are less easily approved by shareholders. Neither of these terms are statistically signi…cant when interacted with historical interlocks, however, and neither a¤ects the magnitude of the direct e¤ect of a historical interlock. These tests o¤er additional evidence that historical interlocks do not lead to acquisitions driven by value-destroying motives.
D. Historical interlock exposure and di¢ culty of valuation
If historical interlocks re ‡ect information that is useful in valuing targets, we would expect them to a¤ect target choice more in environments where the deal is di¢ cult to value. Although an imperfect indicator of informational proximity, di¢ culties in valuation could correspond to geographic positioning such as when the two …rms are headquartered in di¤erent counties. For example, it is common for executives in California's "Silicon Valley" to share ideas through social and network connections, and their relative proximity facilitates such exchanges.
To explore these implications, we interact historical interlocks with an indicator set to unity when the potential acquirer and target are headquartered in the same county. The information hypothesis predicts that these interactions will have a negative e¤ect on target selection since the degree of overlapping non-public information provided by directors is likely to be smaller.
[ Table 9 here] Table 9 presents the results. In the …rst row we re-estimate the baseline speci…cation of equation (2) including the interaction of historical interlocks with the same county indicator on the right-hand side. This term enters negatively and is statistically signi…cant, indicating that the e¤ect of historical interlocks is greater for …rm-pairs where information asymmetries are likely to be largest. Column (2) performs an analogous exercise for contemporaneous interlocks and …nds no such e¤ect. In column (3) we include the interactions of both historical and contemporaneous interlocks with the same-county dummy. In this case we …nd that the interaction with historical interlocks continues to enter negatively and with a high degree of statistical signi…cance while the interaction of contemporaneous interlocks with geographic proximity now enters positively at the ten percent level.
E. Historical interlock exposure and deal outcomes
We now examine the e¤ect of historical interlocks on market reactions to acquisitions by estimating the following regression of abnormal returns around the announcement day:
where CAR m ijt is the cumulative abnormal return to counterparty m 2 facquirer, targetg of the announced merger between …rm i and …rm j in year t, the Z ijt are deal characteristics and the t are …xed e¤ects for years.
We calculate abnormal percentage returns using standard event study methods (e.g., Brown and Warner (1985) ) over a three-day window around the announcement date using the di¤erence between stock returns from the market model and those from the equally weighted index created by the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP).
We estimate the market model parameters for each acquisition using data over the 200 days preceding the start of the announcement window. Control variables include the ratio of total assets for each …rm pair (e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) , Shleifer and Vishny (2003) , Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) ), the total value of the transaction (e.g., Moeller (2004)), and binary indicators for whether the deal was unsolicited (e.g., Schwert (2000)) and whether payment was made primarily in cash (e.g., Huang and Walking (1987), Travlos (1987) ). Table 10 presents the results. Column (1) indicates that historical interlocks do not a¤ect excess returns accruing to the acquirer, but this is not the case for contemporaneous interlocks, which are associated with returns that are 2.6 percent lower. This is consistent with market participants associating contemporaneous interlocks with an increase in the potential for con ‡icts of interest, and illustrates how contemporaneous interlocks di¤er fundamentally from historical ones. Consistent with earlier studies, majority cash deals are related with abnormal returns that are 2.1 percent higher for acquirers while large transactions are associated with lower returns.
In Column (2) we interact historical interlocks with the indicator for a cash deal.
The regression indicates that cash deals with a historical interlock are related to abnormal returns for the acquirer that are 3.7 percent higher than cash deals without a historical interlock. This o¤ers indirect evidence that cash deals, which are likely more arms-length in nature than share exchanges, are less likely to be motivated by social connections, psychological biases, or other value-destroying motives. In columns (3) and (4) we repeat the analysis for abnormal returns among target …rms and …nd no e¤ect of either historical or contemporaneous interlocks.
[ Table 10 here]
As discussed in Section I, the negotiation hypothesis, as a special case of the information interpretation of historical interlocks, predicts that a historically-interlocked director has information that helps the acquirer negotiate more e¤ectively and obtain better deal terms.
To test this prediction, we estimate the e¤ects of historical and contemporaneous interlocks on deal premia measured as the per-share price paid for the target divided by the target share price four weeks prior to the merger announcement. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 10 report the results. Column (5) shows that historical interlocks have no measurable e¤ect on deal premia, but at least do not lower them, while contemporaneous interlocks are associated with acquirers paying 9 percent higher premia on average. This raises the possibility that contemporaneous director connections lower the bargaining power of acquirers, and o¤ers further evidence that historical interlocks di¤er fundamentally from contemporaneous ones.
In column (6) we explore this e¤ect further by interacting historical interlocks with the indicator for cash payment and we …nd that historical interlocks are associated with an increase in deal premia for majority cash deals, which is inconsistent with the negotiation hypothesis. This …nding, combined with our earlier result that acquirers with historical interlocks obtain higher abnormal returns in cash deals, could mean that such historicallyinterlocked deals involve higher synergies for which acquirers must pay higher premia, which is consistent with the transfer of information from targets to potential acquirers.
F. Summary
We now pause to summarize the evidence so far about how historical interlocks matter in merger decisions. And while the transfer of information across …rms is intuitive and appealing, it is possible that other channels are at work. The psychological bias hypothesis, which predicts that directors choose targets based on agency con ‡icts stemming from social or network connections, is perhaps the main contender. We have conducted several tests for psychological biases, but none indicated that they have a measurable e¤ect on the operation of historical interlocks. 20 Indeed, if historical interlocks operated through social connections, those from targets to potential acquirers (i.e., reverse historical interlocks) would also a¤ect acquisition decisions, but Table VI shows that this is not the case. Psychological biases could also come into play if socially-connected directors, even if only historically interlocked, have greater in ‡uence over acquisitions when they hold more important positions at the acquirer.
We test this in Table VII and show that this also is not the case.
As discussed above, director-…rm matching predicts a spurious correlation between inter-…rm director connections and mergers due to similarities among …rms. The failure of reverse historical interlocks to predict acquisitions in Table VI , however, provides no support for this alternative, and we o¤er further evidence against a role for director-…rm matching in Section V below. Finally, cross-…rm director connections may be related to mergers because an acquirer's directors are sometimes placed on the target's board to facilitate the deal. But since our historical interlocks speci…cally omit …rms that shared a director within the past two years, they are unlikely to be associated with director take-on.
On the other hand, director experience may well confer information that is useful for identifying suitable targets or negotiating better deal terms. And consistent with the information hypothesis, Table VII shows that historical interlocks matter more when the interlocked director played a larger role on the potential target's board. We also found that historical interlocks a¤ect merger decisions more when the historically-interlocked director has a larger stake in the acquiring …rm (Table VII) , when his current …rm has better corporate governance (Table VIII) , and the …rm pairs are not in close proximity (Table IX) . These results are again consistent with the information hypothesis and inconsistent with agency con ‡icts driving our main results.
With respect to abnormal returns and deal premia, the psychological bias hypothesis predicts that director-connected deals will perform worse than the average deal. We saw in Table X that this is true for contemporaneously-interlocked …rms, but also that historical interlocks have a positive e¤ect on abnormal returns for cash deals, which are precisely those transactions that are less likely to be driven by motives other than capitalizing on acquisition synergies.
The negotiation hypothesis predicts that information relevant for negotiating favorable terms is transmitted from potential targets to acquirers, but Table X shows that historical interlocks are associated with higher deal premia, if anything. It would also predict that a target's access to information about potential acquirers would help targets to obtain better deal premia, leading targets to solicit acquirers where their directors once worked. And yet we have already seen that reverse historical interlocks do not a¤ect acquisition patterns.
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Finally, the operations hypothesis suggests that recruited directors are useful for running the integrated …rm. And while we cannot test this hypothesis directly, we do not …nd it a compelling explanation for the role of historical interlocks because acquirers can easily recruit target directors and management after a deal has closed.
Taken together, our …ndings are supportive of the information hypothesis and di¢ cult to reconcile with the alternatives, and especially with the psychological bias perspective.
V. Identi…cation and Robustness
The above exercises suggest that historical interlocks re ‡ect the transfer of information from potential targets to acquirers. But it is also well known that directors are not randomly assigned to …rms, and this leaves open the possibility that alternative mechanisms are driving the observed correlation between historical interlocks and acquisitions. Our strategy to address these concerns has four components. First, as discussed in Sections I and II, our historical interlocks by construction omit director seatings where factors other than information transfer are more likely to a¤ect merger decisions. Second, we conducted a variety of tests in Section IV for alternative theories identi…ed by the literature on directors and acquisitions.
In this section we address broad concerns that …rms'director choices are outcomes of optimization problems that take …rm characteristics as their inputs, and that these characteristics also a¤ect merger pairings. For example, since one responsibility of a director is to monitor management, …rms in industries that use managerial capital more intensely may require more outside directors, leading to more historical interlocks, while …rms in these same industries may, for some other reason, also be more likely to acquire one another. Since many unobservable …rm-speci…c characteristics likely to be relevant for director selection are also persistent, we begin by controlling for a wide variety of time-invariant unobservable characteristics with …xed e¤ects (e.g., Ábrahám and White (2006), Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) ). We then consider the possibility that the unobservables are timevarying and calculate how large the e¤ect of such unobserved forces would need to be to completely explain the e¤ect of historical interlocks on acquisition patterns. We conclude by non-parametrically estimating of the e¤ect of historical interlocks on acquisition patterns in a way that does not impose a priori restrictions on the set of potential targets.
A. Time-invariant director selection
We now address the "spurious correlation"that would arise from director-…rm matching using …rm-pair speci…c …xed e¤ects to control for unobservable and time-invariant features that are speci…c to an acquirer, target, or acquirer-target pair. These persistent common factors could include industry positioning, product lines, investment advisors, corporate governance structures, network connectedness, CEO entrenchment, board and …rm size, presence of antitrust pressure, and pro…tability, among many others. Because the number of …rm pairs increases proportionally with the sample size"constructing these …xed e¤ects is computationally infeasible for binary response models due to the incidental variables problem in which the number of parameters increases in proportion to the number of …rm pairs.
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Fortunately, consistent estimates can be obtained by de-meaning a linear probability model, which is econometrically equivalent to including these …xed e¤ects. Table 11 presents the estimated marginal e¤ects of historical interlocks. Column
(1) includes only historical interlocks, column (2) adds contemporaneous interlocks to the regression, and column (3) includes the complete vector of controls from our full speci…cation in Table 5 . In all three equations, historically interlocked …rms are about 7.5 times more likely to merge relative to average …rms. These estimates are larger than those obtained from our logit models, which is expected given that binary response models are downward-biased in rare-events data.
[ Table 11 here]
B. Time-varying director selection
While theory suggests that time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is the most likely form of director selection, in principle time-varying unobserved heterogeneity could be driving the results. To address this, we use the insights developed in Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) to gauge the degree to which time-varying director selection might be at play. The technique quanti…es the amount of selection bias that would be required to explain the entire e¤ect of director experience on acquisition patterns. 
where^ r is the estimated coe¢ cient from a regression with a restricted set of controls and ^ f is the coe¢ cient from a regression with the full set of controls. The key choice in constructing this statistic is to select the restricted set of controls appropriately, so we work with several di¤erent restricted models. An estimated ratio of unity means that selection on unobservables must be at least as strong as selection based on observable characteristics to account for the entire baseline estimate. Similarly, a number greater than one, say 3, would mean that selection on unobservables must be three times greater than selection on observables to attribute the main e¤ect to director selection. Numbers less than one imply that negative selection is present and that the true e¤ect of director experience is in fact larger than the baseline estimates.
Panel B of Table 11 presents the results. The …rst column shows the estimate when the restricted set consists of a constant term only. In this case, the statistic indicates that selection on unobservables would need to be ten times greater than selection on observables to fully explain the e¤ect of historical interlocks on acquisition patterns. A similar result obtains in columns (2) and (3), which include year …xed e¤ects and contemporaneous interlocks.
Column (4), which removes the e¤ect of all time-invariant unobservables, measures the extent to which time-varying unobservables might in ‡uence the main result. The estimated statistic in this case is almost 60, indicating that once director selection based on time-invariant …rm-pair e¤ects has been taken into account, further selection on unobservables must be at least 60 times as large as selection on observables to explain fully the e¤ect of historical interlocks on acquisition patterns.
The …nding that …rm-pair …xed e¤ects do not lead to attrition in the e¤ect of historical interlocks, along with the …nding that time-varying unobserved heterogeneity is unlikely to pose a threat to empirical validity, together provide strong evidence that director selection does not play a crucial role in explaining the observed e¤ect of historical interlocks on acquisition decisions.
C. Matching Estimators
As a …nal set of robustness checks we now obtain estimates of the e¤ects of historical interlocks on merger decisions using matching methods. Matching provides a simple way to form treatment and control groups by selecting on observable covariates and comparing similar …rms that received the treatment (those with historical interlocks) with those that were not treated (e.g., Mo¢ tt (2004), Cameron and Trivedi (2005) ). Here, we apply more structure by implementing a procedure where for each ordered …rm-pair with a historical interlock we construct a control group with similar observed characteristics but no historical interlock. The di¤erence in acquisition patterns between these two groups is an empirical estimate of the treatment e¤ect of historical interlocks. Matching also allows for estimation of average partial ("treatment") e¤ects when the presence of historical interlocks is driven by self-selection, and unlike probit or logit methods, provides nonparametric estimates of such e¤ects. This allows us to assess the importance of the parametric forms used in our earlier analyses.
The propensity score matching is implemented in two stages. First, we run a probit regression for the e¤ects of a historical interlock on …rm or …rm-pair characteristics. We then use the matched sample to correct for selection on observables and estimate the e¤ect of historical interlocks on acquisition outcomes. We estimate the average treatment e¤ect using the unmatched average partial e¤ect to compare with the estimates obtained from nearest neighbor matching as suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2006) using one, two and three nearest neighbors.
[ Table 12 here]
The matching estimator results are presented in Table 12 . Column (1) presents the unmatched treatment e¤ect for comparison. From columns (2)-(4), we can see that the matching estimates are also positive and statistically signi…cant and yield treatment e¤ects of historical interlocks that increase the propensity to acquire by a factor of about 15, which is much larger than the increase implied by the logit estimates in our main analysis (see Table   V ). The results suggest that functional form assumptions are not critical for our results and that the e¤ects of historical interlocks remain even when the set of potential targets is assumed to be much smaller.
VI. Conclusion
The transfer of information about potential merger targets through the past experience of an acquirer's director could have an important impact on decisions in the market for corporate control. We investigate these relationships by creating measures of inter-…rm director linkages from potential targets to potential acquirers. Using a current director's past service at a potential target as a proxy for this information, we …nd that …rms with historical interlocks are more likely to initiate acquisitions with potential targets to which they are linked than those for which they have no historical interlock. Our results indicate an e¤ect of information transfer on acquisition patterns that is independent of other factors such as network connectedness, board take-on, and observed and unobserved …rm characteristics. A series of robustness tests con…rm our main …ndings.
The suggestion that …rms can generate synergies through acquisitions but that their ability to do so is inhibited by informational asymmetries appears to be born out in the data (see, for example, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)). We re…ne this notion by showing that information frictions speci…c to …rm pairs have a quanti…able e¤ect on acquisition patterns. Though we do not consider the implications for optimal portfolio selection here, the fact that director histories are traceable, combined with the tendency for share prices of merger targets to rise, suggests that there may be some value to investors in better understanding these linkages. Panel A shows the distribution of the total number of …rms on whose boards directors served from 1996 to 2006. Panel B shows, at the director-year level, the distribution of the number of simultaneous board seatings held by a given director at a point in time. Panel C shows the percent of historically and contemporaneously-interlocked directors at the potential acquirer or target that during their tenure served as an executive, inside director, were ever a former employee, or were identi…ed as a 'professional director' by the IRRC, where a professional director is an individual whose primary occupation is to hold corporate directorates. Table II  Acquisitions [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] The table presents data on announced acquisitions between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2006 by S&P 1500 …rms with a total deal value exceeding $1 million and where the acquirer obtains at least 20% of the target's shares and owns a majority of the target's shares after the deal. Panel A lists all announced mergers by year of announcement, with median and total amounts in millions of U.S. dollars. Panel B shows the breakdown of announced acquisitions by industry of the target, where manufacturing corresponds to SIC codes 2000-3999, services corresponds to SIC codes 7000-8999, …nance corresponds to SIC codes 6000-6799, retail/wholesale trade corresponds to SIC codes 5000-5999, utilities corresponds to SIC codes 4000-4999, and primary inputs corresponds to SIC codes 0001-1799. Panel C shows, at the …rm-pair level, the frequency of historical and contemporaneous interlocks alone and based on whether the two …rms are headquartered in the same county, where historical and contemporaneous interlocks are de…ned in Section II.
Table III Firm-Level Descriptive Statistics
The table compares characteristics of all in-sample actual acquirers and targets with the mean for all S&P 1500 …rms over the period 1996-2006. Assets is total book value of assets, market capitalization is the total market value of equity computed as common shares outstanding times the …scal year closing price, cash-to-assets is measured as the ratio of cash to total book assets. Debt-to-assets is measured as the ratio of short and long-term debt to total assets and sales-to-assets is total sales revenue divided by total assets. The construction of the market-to-book ratio is described in detail in Section III.A. All amounts are in millions of U.S. dollars. The table reports estimates from logit regressions where the dependent variable is unity if a …rm initiates an acquisition of a target in industry k in year t. The historical interlock is an indicator set to unity if the …rm has a current director who is historically interlocked with a target in industry k as de…ned in Section II.A. The regression in column (2) adds an indicator set to unity if the acquirer has a director with a contemporaneous interlock with a …rm in industry k. The regression in column (3) adds controls for leverage and the log of total assets, while column (4) adds the logs of sales and cash, as well as the market-to-book ratio. All regressions include …xed e¤ects for years. Robust standard errors clustered at the …rm level appear in parentheses beneath the coe¢ cient estimates. *, ** and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable
(1) (2) (3) This table reports estimates from logit regressions for the pair-speci…c match propensity where the dependent variable is unity if …rm i announced an acquisition of potential target j in period t. The variable of interest is the historical interlock (de…ned in Section II.A). Column (2) adds an indicator for whether there is a contemporaneous interlock between the two …rms. Column (3) adds controls for relative size, relative sales-to-assets, and relative market-to-book ratios. Column (4) includes binary indicators set to unity when the potential pair are in the same 4-digit SIC industry or are headquartered in the same county. Column (4) adds industry …xed e¤ects de…ned at the major SIC level. All regressions include …xed e¤ects for years. Robust standard errors clustered at the …rm-pair level appear in parentheses beneath the coe¢ cient estimates. *,**, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) The table reports estimates from logit regressions for the pair-speci…c match propensity where the dependent variable equals unity if an acquisition is announced by potential acquirer i for potential target j in period t. The variables of interest are historical interlocks in the …rst row and reverse historical interlocks from the potential target to a potential acquirer (de…ned in Section IV.A) in the second row. Column (1) includes reverse historical interlocks only and Column (2) adds historical interlocks, while Column (3) adds contemporaneous interlocks. Column (4) adds controls for relative size, sales-to-assets, and market-to-book ratios, and binary indicators for the potential pair being in the same 4-digit SIC industry and for being headquartered in the same county. Column (5) adds …xed e¤ects for industries at the major SIC level. All estimating equations include …xed e¤ects for years. Robust standard errors clustered at the …rm-pair level appear in parentheses beneath the estimated coe¢ cients. *,**, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. (2) and interacts historical interlocks (HI) with an indicator variable for an individual director characteristic. In each case, the indicator variable for the characteristic is also included in the vector of controls. Columns (1)-(3) interact historical interlocks with characteristics of the director at the acquirer and columns (4)- (6) include interactions with characteristics of the director during past service at the potential target. Columns (1), (2) and (3) employ binary indicators set to unity if a historically-interlocked director is also an executive, an inside director, or holds an ownership stake of less than 1 percent at the potential acquirer in year t. Columns (4), (5) and (6) include indicators set to unity if a historicallyinterlocked director was also an executive, an inside director, or a former employee at the potential target during past service there. Robust standard errors clustered at the …rm-pair level appear in parentheses beneath the coe¢ cient estimates. *,**, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable (2) and includes an interaction term of the presence of historical interlocks (HI) with a characteristic of the acquirer's corporate governance. In each case, the variable for corporate governance is included in the vector of controls.
These measures are described in Section IV.C. Column (1) re-estimates the speci…cation from column (4) of Table 5 using only observations for which corporate governance data are available. Columns (2), (3) and (4) interact the presence of a historical interlock with indicator variables for duties, contract and care (also discussed in Section IV.C). Column (5) interacts historical interlocks with the governance index from Gompers et. al (2003) . Columns (6) and (7) interact the presence of a historical interlock with indicators for the presence of control-share acquisition laws and supermajority provisions, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the …rm-pair level appear in parentheses beneath the coe¢ cient estimates. *,**, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) Table IX  Historical Interlocks and Information Environment   The table reports estimates from logit regressions for the pairspeci…c match propensity where the dependent variable equals unity if an acquisition is announced by …rm i for potential target j in period t. The variables of interest are historical interlocks in the …rst row, contemporaneous interlocks in the second row, and their respective interactions with a binary indicator set to unity if the two …rms are headquartered in the same county. All columns estimate the full speci…cation of equation (2) while at the same time including either or both of the interaction terms. Column (1) includes the interaction of the presence of a historical interlock and the same county dummy. Column (2) includes, instead, the interaction of the presence of a contemporaneous interlock and the same county dummy. Column (3) includes both interaction terms. All estimating equations include …xed e¤ects for years and for major SIC industries. Robust standard errors clustered at the …rm-pair level appear in parentheses beneath the estimated coe¢ cients. *,**, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) The table reports estimates of regressions where the dependent variable for an announced acquisition by acquirer i of target j in year t is the cumulative abnormal return (de…ned in Section IV.E) in columns (1)-(4) and where the dependent variable equals the deal premium on announced acquisitions in columns (5)- (6), de…ned as the ratio of the price paid per share for the target divided by the target's price four weeks prior to the announcement of the deal. The variables of interest are the historical and contemporaneous interlocks (de…ned in Section II.A), the majority cash payment indicator, and the interactions of the interlock variables with the majority cash indicator. The control variables, described in Section IV.E, are indicators for whether the deal was a tender o¤er or was unsolicited, as well as the ratio of total assets for the two …rms and the money value of the transaction. All speci…cations include …xed e¤ects for years. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses beneath the coe¢ cient estimates. *,**, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A reports estimates from linear probability models for the pair-speci…c match propensity expressed as the percent increase in the probability that acquirer i announces an acquisition of potential target j in period t. Column (1) includes the historical interlock and year e¤ects only. Column (2) includes contemporaneous interlocks and column (3) includes the full vector of controls from Table 4 . All estimating equations include …xed e¤ects for years and for ordered …rm pairs. T-statistics derived from robust standard errors clustered at the …rm-pair level appear in parentheses beneath the coe¢ cient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each cell of Panel B reports ratios based on the coe¢ cient for historical interlocks from regressions on the probability that …rm i acquires …rm j in year t. The ratio is calculated as f =( r f ), where r is the estimate on historical interlocks obtained from an equation using a restricted set of controls and f is the estimate on historical interlocks from the full regression which includes …rm-pair speci…c …xed e¤ects. The restricted set of controls is a constant (column (1)), year …xed e¤ects (column (2)), year …xed e¤ects and contemporaneous interlocks (column (3)), and year e¤ects, contemporaneous interlocks, and the full set of controls less …rm-pair …xed e¤ects (column (4)).
Panel A: E¤ect of historical interlock from …xed e¤ects model This table reports matching estimates for the pair-speci…c match propensities described in Section V.C. The …rst column reports unmatched estimates of the average treatment e¤ect. Columns (2), (3) and (4) report one, two and three nearest-neighbor matching estimates of the e¤ect of historical interlocks on acquisitions. Average treatment e¤ects are expressed as percentage increases relative to the control group. T-statistics appear in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
